Paper index

  • “In Das Kapital Marx distinguishes between concrete and abstract labour. But what is abstract labour? In Section 1 I develop an explicitly normative account of this notion and argue that such a reading is essential for understanding what motivates the labour theory of value, not just of Marx himself but in general. Then, in Section 2, I use this normative reading in order to reconstruct and resolve a serious problem for Marx’s theory of value and his conception of political economy. This is the so-called reduction problem, the problem of…

  • In her book Entfremdung—Zur Aktualität eines sozialphilosophischen Problems, Rahel Jäggi argues that critical theory needs to rehabilitate the concept of alienation. I would strengthen her claim: critical theory must not only recover this concept, it must, unlike Jäggi, construe alienation as bound up with the nature of work under capitalist relations of exchange, hence production. Alienation is first and foremost alienated labour. Recovering a notion of alienation in this strong sense is essential to identifying motives for the kind of social change needed if we are to find just solutions…

  • Im Rahmen meiner Bemühungen um eine Rehabilitierung des Marx’schen Entfremdungsbegriffs rekonstruiere ich eine These, die Marx offensichtlich als wesentlich für diesen Begriff betrachtet, die aber ausgesprochen rätselhaft ist: dass der Mensch ein „Gattungswesen“ ist, das als solches die eigene Gattung und die Gattungen der übrigen Dinge zum Gegenstand macht. Zu diesem Zweck ziehe ich den formalen Begriff der „Existenz“ bei Heidegger heran. Auf der Basis dieser Interpretation versuche ich plausibel zu machen, dass, wenn man Gattungswesen und Natur so versteht, man verständlich machen kann, wie sich der Arbeiter seinem Wesen…

  • Nachstehendes ist ein Referat zum dritten Kapitel des neuen, erst 2015 bei Harvard University Press erschienenen Buchs von Michael Tomasello, A Natural History of Human Morality. Das Kapitel selbst trägt den Titel “Second-Personal Morality”. Das Referat wurde am 30.sten Juni, 2016, in dem Doktoranden-Kolloquium von Axel Honneth an der Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt am Main, abgehalten.

    Ich möchte mich bei Christian Schmidt für sehr nützliche Kommentare und Kritik bedanken.

  • This short paper was given at the annual conference of the Society for Human Ecology, on April 15th., 2016.

  • This paper represents a development of arguments first deployed in two papers from 2015, namely, “Attitudes de se and de me” and “Consciousness, Self-Consciousness and Essential Indexicality.” (Both these earlier papers are also available at this website.) This paper improves on the previous ones by including a more extensive and improved discussion of what various authors mean by, and what could be meant by, indexical, more precisely, first-person belief. It also includes a discussion of Perry’s later concept of belief, which appeals to the notion of reflexive truth conditions—see §…

  • In sentences of the type “S believes that he/she/it is Φ” the pronoun occurring within the scope of the verb ‘believes’ in such sentences is sometimes used anaphorically to refer to the subject of belief S. I shall argue that when the pronoun is being used in this anaphoric way, the whole sentence is not always functioning as a device for attributing to the subject S an indexical, indeed first-personal belief—what I shall call a belief de me. In other words, to use terminology first introduced by Lewis and now…

  • Dan Zahavi argues for a Sartrean conception of consciousness which he regards as endorsed by numerous other thinkers in the phenomenological tradition and as superior to both contemporary “higher-order” and “one-level” (neo-)Brentanian conceptions. As Zahavi points out, all three conceptions—the ostensibly phenomenological, the “higher-order” and the Brentanian—assume that consciousness is to be explicated as a form of self-awareness. Only under this assumption, thinks Zahavi, can one endorse the thesis deriving from Nagel that a psychological state or experience is conscious only if there is something it is like to be…

  • For years public transport campaigners have enthused about light rail for Canberra, typically from Gungahlin to Civic. And now the ACT government has signed up to it! We’ve made it! Truly transformational change is in the offing! … Or is it? In all the enthusiasm for light rail too few have looked critically at the transport policy platform which underpins the design and implementation of light rail. This platform is contained in the ACT government’s 2012 document Transport for Canberra (TfC). I will argue that the general conception outlined in…

  • I will be adding an abstract later.
    This is the long version of a paper held on 13th., June, 2013, in the Doktorandenkolloquium of Prof. Dr. Axel Honneth, Institut für Philosophie, Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt am Man.

  • Thomas Princen (The Logic of Sufficiency, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2005) argues that a principal cause of unsustainability in modern societies is their reliance on the notion of efficiency in their decisions concerning resource use. Unfortunately, Princen casts his thesis in such general, unelaborated terms that his argument is not convincing: one sees neither that modern society is reliant on such a principle nor that this reliance is a cause of unsustainability. The paper overcomes this deficit by making clear what Princen does not: the distinctive re-organisation of work…

  • In the 1990’s America experienced a wave of popular writing on consumerism of which the flagships were The Overworked American by Juliet Schor, Luxury Fever by Robert Frank and Affluenza–The All-Consuming Epidemic by John de Graaf, David Wann and Thomas Naylor. In these writings American consumer capitalism was presented as a treadmill in which people overwork in order to overspend, with deleterious consequences both for themselves and for society at large. This literature, and in particular these flagships, have been appropriated by Clive Hamilton and Richard Deniss of The Australia

  • I will be adding an abstract later.

  • I will be adding an abstract later.

  • Nachstehendes bildet den Text eines Vortrags, den ich am 24.07.2009 im Institut für Philosophie an der Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt am Main, gehalten habe. Ich werde sobald wie möglich ein richtiges Abstrakt schreiben.

    Für inhaltliche wie auch sprachliche Kritik möchte ich mich bei Karl Mertens bedanken.

  • I will be adding an abstract later.

  • I will be adding an abstract later. This paper presupposes an understanding of material presented in the Powerpoint presentation Heidegger on Anxiety. I will eventually expand the claim that one can use the life of Luther to understand Heidegger. Specifically, I will argue that one can use, not Luther’s Anfechtungen, but the events of 1505 which led him to enter the monastery, in order to understand what Heidegger means by Dasein’s Sein zum Tode.

  • This paper is a slightly revised version of a paper given, I think, at a staff seminar of the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Sydney, on May 11th., 2007.

  • This is a slightly revised version of my contribution to the ERE Panel Discussion on Sustainability and Economic Growth held at Macquarie University on December 10th., 2006.

  • This is the (slightly revised and corrected) text of a speech I gave as invited speaker at the annual dinner at International House in mid-2004.

  • This paper argues that first person thought and talk presents a significant problem for the normatively pragmatist conception of semantic and intentional content advocated by Robert Brandom. Section 1 identifies the central theses which define this conception of content. Section 2 then outlines Brandom’s account of the use of the first person singular pronoun, at the same time indicating how Brandom’s normatively pragmatist conception of content has shaped the way he deals with the first person, in particular, how he responds to the issues raised by Perry and others concerning…